Office for Nuclear Regulation

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AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield planned inspections

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This report covers planned inspections at the AWE Aldermaston and Burghfield Licensed Site and is undertaken in accordance with ONR's Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for the Atomic Weapons Establishment Programme.

The inspections undertaken at the Burghfield Licensed Site form part of a series of planned interventions in accordance with the IIS and Integrated Intervention Plan (IIP).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The intervention was performed in line with ONR's guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

ONR inspectors conducted a planned inspection of the implementation of the arrangements in respect of the Licence Conditions (LCs) that form a systems based inspection within the Assembly Facility at the AWE Burghfield site. The facility's Criticality Incident Detection and Alarm Systems (CIDAS) and movement control system were inspected.

ONR inspectors conducted an assessment of implementation of the Licence Condition (LC) 11, Emergency Arrangements through a Level 1 Emergency Exercise demonstration on the AWE Aldermaston Nuclear Licensed Site.

ONR also conducted interventions on a Level 1 Emergency Exercise Presentation, Overview and Familiarisation Tour, Assembly Periodic Safety Review (PRS2) Electrical, Control and Instrumentation (EC&I) Design Assessment Reports (DARs), at the Burghfield Nuclear Licensed Site Level 3 RIM and the Assembly Facility's response to the recent Electric Shock Event on the Aldermaston site.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

N/A

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

For this systems based inspection, ONR concluded that, based on the sample inspected that it was satisfied that there were no significant shortfalls identified for all applicable licence conditions that form the systems based inspection. A rating against LC 34 was judged to be not applicable. ONR gained confidence, from the sample inspected, that there is a clear link from the safety case through the safe operating envelope to the management controls at an operations level for both CIDAS and movement control systems. ONR considered that maintenance and movement controls were being appropriately implemented and that staff within the facility were aware of the safety significance of the facility's movement controls and Criticality Clearance Certificates. Overall, it was judged that the system inspected met the requirements of the safety case with no requirement for regulatory action.

For the interventions on a Level 1 Emergency Exercise Presentation, Overview and Familiarisation Tour, Assembly Periodic Safety Review (PRS2) Electrical, Control and Instrumentation (EC&I) Design Assessment Reports (DARs), at the Burghfield Nuclear Licensed Site Level 3 RIM and the Assembly Facility's response to Electric Shock Event. ONR was satisfied that there were no shortfalls and no need for any regulatory action at this point.

Conclusion of Intervention

It is ONR's opinion that of the sample inspected, there were no significant shortfalls in the implementation of the established arrangements, within the Assembly Facility, in respect of the Licence Conditions that form a systems based inspection for the CIDAS and movement control systems. With the exception of LC 34, this was judged as not applicable.

There are no other findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.

The planned interventions set out in the Integrated Intervention Strategy for the Burghfield site remain valid and will be followed for future inspections.