The purpose of this intervention was to conduct Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspections at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited’s Torness Power Station in accordance with the planned inspection programme contained in the Torness Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for 2015/16.
This intervention was undertaken by the Nominated ONR Site Inspector for Torness, with support from ONR Inspectors for the statutory outage of reactor 2.
This intervention included compliance inspections against the following Licence Conditions (LCs):
No safety system inspection was undertaken, hence this is not applicable.
The LC16 inspection examined Torness’ arrangements for site plans, designs and specifications, and the implementation of those arrangements.
During the course of my inspection, I was satisfied that Torness holds and maintains up to date documents necessary to satisfy the statutory requirements of LC16. I noted Torness’ intention to increase the security marking of the site schedule, and requested that the information on nuclear hazards should simultaneously be completed and made more consistent.
I judge that Torness’ arrangements for compliance with LC16 covered during this inspection and the implementation of those arrangements are adequate and meet the requirements of ONR guidance.
The LC30 inspection examined Torness’ arrangements for periodic shutdown, and focussed on Torness’ implementation of those arrangements during the course of the outage of reactor 2.
I sampled a number of safety significant areas identified on Torness’ Asset Management System (AMS), and I was satisfied that Torness has in place thorough and systematic processes for the organisation of its shutdown activities and for the maintenance, inspection and testing of safety related systems. However, I strongly emphasised the need for Torness to progress and close an existing issue previously raised in a separate inspection by an ONR Specialist Inspector.
I requested Torness to put in place a plan of action to undertake a comprehensive check of all entries into AMS to ensure that no further occurrences of mislabelling remain in the system. Recognising the size of this task, this plan of action should aim to prioritise the more safety significant systems, and should be in place within 28 days of the consent to restart being granted by ONR.
Based on my inspection sample, I judge that Torness’ arrangements and the implementation of those arrangements are of a good standard and meet the requirements of ONR guidance. However due to the need to progress the issue noted above, I have downgraded the rating to adequate.
My LC36 inspection examined Torness’ organisational capability arrangements and the implementation of those arrangements. My inspection included amongst others the examination of the nuclear baseline, how proposed changes to personnel or to the structure of the organisation are managed through Torness’ ‘management of change’ processes, and how Torness evaluate and manage the impact on nuclear safety.
Based on my observations, I judge that Torness’ arrangements and the implementation of those arrangements are of a good standard and meet the requirements of ONR guidance.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
I am satisfied that the arrangements and their implementation at Torness for LC16 and LC30 are adequate, and are of good standard for LC36, and I judge that the outcome of the sample inspections undertaken met expectations detailed within relevant ONR guidance. I have therefore rated the LC16, LC30 and LC36 elements with an IIS rating of 3 (adequate), 3 (adequate) and 2 (good standard) respectively.
There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety or which would result in changes to the planned interventions and inspections of Torness Power Station.