Office for Nuclear Regulation

This website uses non-intrusive cookies to improve your user experience. You can visit our cookie privacy page for more information.

EDF Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) Torness Power Station (TOR) Reactor 2 (R2) 2015 Statutory Outage: Control and Instrumentation (C&I) Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This intervention report covers my control and instrumentation (C&I) inspection performed as part of an ONR civil nuclear reactor programme (CNRP) intervention applicable to EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) during the outage of Reactor 2 (R2) at Torness (TOR) Power Station. The main focus of my inspection was to verify that relevant work activities have been carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to safety in order to confirm that they remain fit for their intended purpose at Torness.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

My inspection was in support of ONR’s 2015/16 Statutory Outage inspection programme. The outcome of my inspection, which included a review of progress made regarding various work items and projects associated with C&I equipment and systems important to safety at Torness, covered NGL’s arrangements under Licence Conditions LC22 (Modification or experiment on existing plant) and LC28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing). My inspection is intended to provide a contribution towards ONR’s regulatory decision as to whether a Consent in accordance with LC30 (Periodic shutdown) should be issued to allow Reactor 2 at Torness to return to normal operating service.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

This inspection has found that the commitments made in the Torness Reactor 2 Outage Intentions Document (OID) for C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety have been satisfied for those elements of work complete at the time of the inspection. My inspection of the work activities covered during this intervention has found that the workmanship applied was adequate and consistent with the standards expected from C&I suitably qualified and experienced persons (SQEP) personnel.

I have raised 3 actions during the inspection. None of these actions require resolution prior to return to service of Reactor 2. All three actions will be captured within the ONR Issues Database.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

On the basis of my inspection of the C&I aspects of the Torness Reactor 2 outage, I recommend that support be given for a Consent to allow Reactor 2 at Torness to return to normal operating service.

Based on the findings of my inspection, I have assigned an integrated intervention strategy (IIS) rating of 4 (below standard) to LC 28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing) as a consequence of deficiencies in the recording of test pass criteria and because a number of entries have been corrupted on the central maintenance (AMS) system.

Based on the findings of my inspection, I have assigned an integrated intervention strategy (IIS) rating of 3 (adequate) to LC 22 (Modification or experiment on existing plant) as a consequence of my review of the essential plant protection equipment and the Torness On-Line Computer System (TOLCS) software updates.