RRMPOL planned inspection
- Site: RRMPOL
- IR number: 15-109
- Date: February 2016
- LC numbers: 10, 23, 24, 27, 28, 34
Purpose of intervention
This was a planned inspection of the chemical plant at Rolls-Royce Marine Power Operations Ltd (RRMPOL) site, undertaken as part of a series of planned interventions for 2015/16.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
A team of ONR inspectors carried out a System Based Inspection (SBI) of RRMPOL chemical plant’s criticality controls. The team consisted of the ONR nominated site inspector, criticality specialist, mechanical specialist, human factors specialist and fault analysis specialist. A representative of RRMPOL’s internal regulator accompanied and assisted the inspection.
This intervention was performed in line with ONR’s technical inspection guides in the areas inspected.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
The chemical plant criticality controls were judged to meet the requirements of the safety case.
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
The ONR team carried out a system based inspection of the chemical plant criticality controls and concluded that:
- LC10 (Training): We were satisfied that the operating and maintenance personnel interviewed were adequately trained in the operation / maintenance of safety systems relating to control of criticality. It was identified that on occasions the approach to training was based upon local arrangements rather than site wide arrangements.
- LC23 (Operating rules): We were satisfied that safety case conditions and limits had been identified and that there was adequate criticality based operating rules in place to support operations and that these were adequately implemented.
- LC24 (Operating instructions): The general finding was that the chemical plant facility operating / maintenance work instructions sampled were of sufficient detail to identify the key features of the safety systems and structures that ensure that the limits and conditions identified in the safety case are met. Some areas for improvement were identified with regard to the clarity of the written instructions, marking of the criticality zones, plant configuration control for maintenance handover, acceptance criteria for maintenance engineers and the marking of components.
- LC27 (Safety mechanisms, devices and circuits (SMDCs)): On the basis of the sample taken we concluded that the plant had in place a system to ensure that SMDCs are properly connected, identified and in a good working order.
- LC28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing (EIMT)): RRMPOL was able to demonstrate an adequate linkage between the requirements of the safety case and the regular and systematic EIMT being carried out on the plant. Some areas for improvement were identified with regard to governance arrangement of RRMPOL’s software based maintenance tool, arrangements relating to reporting of missed maintenance, written isolation arrangements and the maintenance requirements relating to systems required to protect against internal / external hazards.
- LC34 (Leakage and escape of radioactive material and radioactive waste): We didn’t identify any sign of leakage from the plant. We sampled the licensee’s arrangement for ensuring that any leak remained within a safe geometry. The wastes and drains sampled appeared to be in good working order.
Conclusion of Intervention
Based upon evidence gathered during this inspection, we consider that the requirements of the safety case with regard to control of criticality have been adequately implemented on RRMPOL’s chemical plant.
There are no findings from this inspection that have raised any immediate concerns with regard to nuclear safety. We identified instances of staff training based upon local arrangements rather than formal site wide arrangements; although it was noted that RRMPOL is in the process of developing a site wide based training scheme. It was noted that the internal / external hazards part of the safety case was not fully implemented on-site at the time of this inspection; however, plans appeared to already be in place to address this issue. A number of areas for improvement were identified with regards to operating instructions and maintenance arrangements. These matters will be monitored by ONR’s nominated site inspector as part of routine regulatory interactions and licence condition compliance inspections during 2016/17.