Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Magnox Ltd. Corporate Compliance Inspection – LC10

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This report covers a planned intervention of Magnox Ltd’s Corporate Centre, undertaken in pursuance of ONR’s compliance inspection plan. This intervention is the second of a two-part intervention designed to obtain a regulatory view of arrangements within Magnox Ltd for training and assurance of personnel competence.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

During this intervention, we carried out a compliance inspection of the corporate Learning & Development (L&D) function against LC 10 Training.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

The main focus of this intervention was to gauge the quality of training delivered within Magnox and how this is controlled and maintained across the Magnox Ltd sites. To achieve this, two functional areas were sampled: Emergency Preparedness and Planning, and Radiation Safety.

The technical content of training courses is owned by Subject Matter Experts within the relevant function peer groups. Courses are designed and then consulted on within the peer group. The Learning and Development function advises on training design and delivery. We found a culture of review prior to each delivery was evident from the functions sampled to ensure course content is fit-for-purpose.

We found that when Magnox Ltd has made changes to training content, it is the responsibility of the relevant Subject Matter Expert to determine the mechanism for promulgating the update to previously trained staff. Where the identified update method is not through formal re-training (which would be captured by due process), there is no formal mechanism for recording that this has been completed to enable demonstration of the up-to-date suitably qualified and experienced person (SQEP) status of the intended persons. We recommended that Magnox Ltd considers its arrangements for promulgation of minor consequential training updates and for recording that such updates have been received and understood by the intended persons.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence gathered during this intervention, we concluded that ther|e are no matters that may impact significantly on nuclear safety and that Magnox demonstrated an adequate standard of compliance with LC10 training.