Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Hunterston B planned intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake Licence Condition [LC] compliance inspections at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s [NGL’s] Hunterston B power station, in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hunterston B Integrated Intervention Strategy [IIS] for 2015/16.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

This intervention included compliance inspections against the following Licence Conditions:

I undertook preparatory inspections and discussions with the station’s strategic outage manager and supply chain manager ahead of the Reactor 3 statutory outage scheduled to commence in October 2015. I also undertook a monthly meeting with the station’s independent nuclear assurance [INA] evaluators.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No system inspection was undertaken during this intervention

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

In relation to LC 7:

I examined the station arrangements for ensuring effective organisational learning from incidents occurring on the station, across the fleet and externally.

I sampled recent investigation reports for adequacy against company arrangements.

I sampled learning briefs issued following incidents occurring during the previous 6 months.

I judged that the formal corrective action process employed on station has appropriate maturity; organisational learning is gaining improved breadth across the station and I am satisfied the station has the motivation to strengthen the preventative aspect of organisational learning through improved benchmarking and self-assessment. The sampled investigation report provides continued assurance that the station is executing its investigation processes in a diligent manner.

In relation to LC 30, I agreed with the station provisional dates for reactor start-up meetings and date for issue of consent to restart. I also examined the station’s finalised selection of channels to be inspected during the statutory outage. This information will be considered further by specialist inspectors.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

From an LC 7 perspective, I have allocated an IIS rating of 3 – Adequate.

There are no findings from this inspection that could significantly undermine nuclear safety.