Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Heysham 2 Power Station – Reactive Intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this reactive intervention was to gather information at EDF Nuclear Generation Limited (NGL) Heysham 2 power station for a future planned system based inspection (SBI) and to discuss recent incident notifications and their progress.

Part of this reactive intervention included attendance at the Emergency Control Centre (ECC) for Heysham 1 as an observer to the Heysham 1 response to its site incident which was declared on 13/08/2015.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

Information gathering for a future system based inspection and discussions with operation and technical support managers.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No safety system inspection was undertaken, hence this is not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

Overall, my discussions at Heysham 2 provided me with a higher appreciation of the gas circulator safety case and plant arrangements. The incident notifications have either been completed by the station and are awaiting ONR’s response or are being progressed which will be monitored by the site inspector during normal regulatory business. 

My observations of the Heysham 1 ECC team during the site incident were consistent with ONR’s expectations for LC11 in the management and organisation of the ECC team and its structure. The ECC team demonstrated good behaviours and team working. Key focus boards provided a sufficient level of information to establish quickly what the incident was, actions to be addressed and the status of the incident.

Conclusion of Intervention

There are no findings from this reactive intervention that could significantly undermine nuclear safety and no change to the planned interventions and inspections of Heysham 2.