Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Hartlepool Planned Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

The purpose of this intervention was to undertake a Licence Condition (LC) compliance inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Limited’s (NGL’s) Hartlepool power station in line with the planned inspection programme contained in the Hartlepool Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for 2015/16.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The inspection was based on sampling the implementation of the arrangements in place against licence condition 22 (modification or experiment on existing plant).  Meetings were held with key site personnel and the main findings of the discussions were communicated to the Hartlepool Technical and Safety Support Manager.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

As part of this intervention, ONR reviewed the progress being made at Hartlepool power station in connection with existing ONR issues, including an ONR intervention associated with the management of examination, inspection, maintenance and testing of essential systems across the NGL nuclear fleet.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

No system based inspections were performed.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

I judge that compliance with LC22 is adequate, warranting an IIS rating of 3. Modifications to plant in support of the reactor water ingress safety case, and repairs to the structural supports of direct contact heater number 2 on both reactors have been raised, managed and sentenced in accordance with the licensee’s own internal process.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence gathered during this intervention, there are no findings to indicate that the implemented modifications sampled during this intervention will significantly undermine nuclear safety. The licensee has demonstrated that due process for the implementation and sentencing of these modifications has been followed adequately.

The licensee has provided information which will be used to update several ONR issues associated with the risk estimates for off-site radiological release and the fleet-wide intervention on the management of examination, inspection maintenance and testing of concealed systems.

I raised the following actions as a result of this intervention:

The licensee is to provide the close out statements for the modifications in support of the reactor water ingress safety case and repairs to the direct contact heater no. 2 when they are implemented during the next R1 refuelling outage.

The licensee will provide a programme of ALARP improvements to high pressure back up cooling system, gas turbines, low pressure back up cooling system and carbon dioxide supply and processing.