Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Planned Intervention at Dungeness B

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was a planned intervention at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (NGL’s) Dungeness B (DNB) power station, undertaken as part of the planned Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The key inspections during this intervention were for licence compliance covering the following licence conditions (LC):

I had also intended to inspect compliance with LC 7 (Incidents on the site), but had to postpone this to March 2016, due to last minute lack of availability of key station staff.

During this visit I also met with the site independent nuclear assurance representatives.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

For LC 22, I inspected categorisation of modifications, use of quality plans and completion of documentation after the physical work.  I judged that categorisation was appropriate and noted that documentation had been completed after the physical modifications.  The use of quality plans was judged appropriate, however some minor anomalies were identified with their production and use.  I judged that these minor anomalies did not impact on the implementation of the modifications.  I did, however recommend that the licensee needed to improve the use of quality plans in these areas.  Taking into account the three elements of modification, I judged that compliance with LC 22 was adequate and hence assigned an IIS rating of 3.

For LC 26, I inspected the control and supervision of the work of technicians, primarily for their tasks of recording plant measurements and plant tours.  I found that there were procedures in place to control the work of the technicians, but that these did not all reflect the current practice of using personal digital assistants for recording plant measurements.  I further found that the team leader’s supervision of technicians needed improvement.  I therefore raised actions with the station to address these shortfalls which will be monitored through the ONR issues database. Overall, I judged that control and supervision was below standard and hence assigned an IIS rating of 4.

In summary, I inspected recent organisational management of change proposals and found that these had been processed adequately.  I inspected compliance with the organisational baseline, which describes the minimum organisation to operate the station safely. I found that the site complied with the defined baseline, but had concerns that the baseline may not be complete.  I therefore agreed a number of actions with the site to justify completeness of the baseline.  I had no firm evidence of a shortfall and have therefore judged that compliance with LC 36 was adequate and assigned an IIS rating of 3.

In relation to the other activities undertaken in this intervention, no key findings arose.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence obtained during this intervention, no matters have been identified that are likely to have a significant impact on nuclear safety or protection of the public in the event of an emergency on the Station at this time.  Therefore, no additional regulatory action arising from this visit is considered necessary at this time.