Office for Nuclear Regulation

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EDF Energy – Nuclear Generation Ltd -  Dungeness B Planned Intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was a planned intervention at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (NGL’s) Dungeness B (DNB) power station, undertaken as part of the planned Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The key inspections during this intervention were for licence compliance covering the following licence conditions (LC):

During this visit I also met with the site independent nuclear assurance and trade union safety representatives.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

The IIS plan for this visit required a compliance inspection against LC 11, specifically assessment of the Emergency Arrangements Review Meeting (EARM).  However the intervention also included the following three topics, which are also related to LC 11:

I therefore extended the LC 11 compliance inspection to include these.

For the four topics, my principle conclusions were:

I concluded that the EARM, which was the planned part of the intervention, demonstrated adequate compliance with LC 11.  The other topics demonstrated improvements in compliance in some areas, but shortfalls in others.  The licensee proposed appropriate action to address the shortfalls and I judged that no further action by ONR was necessary.  Overall I judged that compliance with LC 11 was adequate and assigned this an IIS rating of 3.

In relation to the other activities undertaken in this intervention, no key findings arose.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence obtained during this intervention, no matters have been identified that are likely to have a significant impact on nuclear safety or protection of the public in the event of an emergency on the Station at this time.  Therefore, no additional regulatory action arising from this visit is considered necessary at this time.