This was a planned inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (NGL’s) Dungeness B (DNB) power station, undertaken as part of the planned Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).
The key interventions during this inspection were for licence compliance covering the following licence conditions (LC):
Overall, I inspected the training and use of suitably qualified and experienced personnel (SQEP) for the following decision making processes:
I found that the licensee had suitable training in place for the roles in the decision making processes. From inspecting the training records and interviewing staff who had participated in recent applications of the processes, the licensee demonstrated that the majority of the staff had received appropriate training and had suitable experience. I identified two shortfalls:
Two individuals who participated in ODM had no record of formal ODM training, although I had no reason to believe that this impacted on the decisions made.
The SCA specification did not clearly identify the key roles and their training and experience requirements, although I judged that the implementation of the process use appropriate personnel.
I agreed actions with the licensee to address these shortfalls. I judged that compliance with LC 10 was adequate and therefore assigned an IIS rating of 3 and that compliance with LC 12 was below standard and hence assigned an IIS rating of 4.
For LC30, a team from ONR attended the 2015 Reactor 22 Start-up Meeting and associated plant walkdown. This was an effective meeting with the way forward agreed on all outstanding issues and appropriate actions placed. On the basis of the meeting alone, I would rate this as good standard. The rating however, also needs to reflect the plant walkdown, where we identified a number of areas for improvement. I therefore judged the overall compliance to be adequate and hence have assigned this an IIS rating of 3.
In relation to the other activities undertaken in this intervention, no key findings arose.
The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.
From the evidence obtained during this intervention, no matters have been identified that are likely to have a significant impact on nuclear safety on the station at this time. Therefore, no additional regulatory action arising from this visit is considered necessary at this time.