Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Dungeness B R22 Statutory Outage Control & Instruction (C&I) Inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This intervention report covers my control and instrumentation (C&I) inspection performed as part of an ONR civil nuclear reactor programme (CNRP) intervention applicable to EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd (NGL) during the outage of Reactor 22 (R22) at Dungeness B (DNB) Power Station. The main focus of my inspection was to verify that relevant work activities have been carried out in relation to C&I equipment and systems important to safety in order to confirm that they remain fit for their intended purpose at DNB.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

My inspection was in support of ONR’s 2015/16 Statutory Outage inspection programme. The outcome of my inspection, which included a review of progress made regarding various work items and projects associated with C&I equipment and systems important to safety at DNB, covered NGL’s arrangements under Licence Conditions LC22 (Modification or experiment on existing plant) and LC28 (Examination, inspection, maintenance and testing). My inspection is intended to provide a contribution towards ONR’s regulatory decision as to whether a Consent in accordance with LC30 (Periodic shutdown) should be issued to allow R22 at DNB to return to normal operating service.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

This inspection has found that the commitments made in the DNB R22 Outage Intensions Document (OID) for C&I equipment and systems important to nuclear safety have been satisfied. My inspection of the work activities covered during this intervention has found that the workmanship applied was adequate and consistent with the standards expected from C&I SQEP personnel.

I have raised five actions during the inspection. None of these actions require resolution prior to return to service of Reactor 22. All five actions will be captured within the ONR Issues Database.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

On the basis of my inspection of the C&I aspects of the DNB R22 outage, I recommend that support be given for a Consent to allow R22 at DNB to return to normal operating service.

Based on the findings of my inspection, I have assigned an integrated intervention strategy (IIS) rating of 3 (adequate) to LC 22. As a consequence of;

evidence found during this inspection that the recording of measurements pass / fail criteria, decision making and where necessary justification for continued use is not applied in all circumstances; and

the storage of spare instrumentation needs to be improved to meet what I consider to be relevant good practice.

I have assigned an IIS rating of 4 (below standard) to LC28.