Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Dungeness B planned inspection

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was a planned inspection at EDF Energy Nuclear Generation Ltd’s (NGL’s) Dungeness B (DNB) power station, undertaken as part of the planned Integrated Intervention Strategy (IIS) for the Civil Nuclear Reactor Programme (CNRP) of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The key interventions during this inspection were for licence compliance covering the following licence conditions (LC):

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

For LC 26, we inspected control and supervision of a number of operations on the site, both related to the statutory outage on Reactor 22, which was underway at the time, and not outage-related.  All working groups had the principal document to control operations, a work order card, and most also had other supporting instructions.  We found some minor issues in some cases and have recommended where the station could improve.  We also found that the level of supervision was adequate.  We concluded that control of both outage and non-outage related work was adequate and therefore assigned an IIS rating of 3.

For LC 32 and LC 34, we inspected progress on outstanding radioactive waste issues raised by ONR and processing of low level waste.  We found that the containment of radioactive waste was adequate and hence assigned an IIS rating of 3 for LC 34.  We found that the system for processing LLW was adequate, but that the records system for LLW was not consistent with practices elsewhere and should be modernised.  We did not place an action for this, however, since it did not impact directly on compliance with LC 32.  We did find, however, that:

The station had made little progress on current issues

It did not appear to have made any prior planning for radwaste arisings during the outage and hence would need to react to any arisings.  As the outage was already underway we decided that there was no benefit in raising an issue, but will raise it at the outage start up meeting.

On the basis of these two shortfalls, we judged that compliance with LC 32 was below standard and assigned this an IIS rating of 4.

In relation to the other activities undertaken in this intervention, no key findings arose.

The intervention was performed in line with ONR’s guidance requirements (as described in our technical inspection guides) in the areas inspected.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence obtained during this intervention, no matters have been identified that are likely to have a significant impact on nuclear safety on the station at this time.  Therefore, no additional regulatory action arising from this visit is considered necessary at this time.