Transport inspection at Urenco UK Limited
- Site: Urenco UK Limited, Capenhurst
- IR number: 15-087
- Date: March 2016
- LC numbers: N/A
Purpose of intervention
ONR Transport Inspection and Enforcement (TIE) Sub-Programme observed Exercise Willow. This exercise was a demonstration of Urenco Ltd arrangements, as a Radsafe Level 2 and 3 responder, to respond to an offsite transport incident. Urenco Ltd’s response was deemed to be adequate and no significant findings were raised. The Inspector did raise some observations concerning the response of the Emergency Services.
The observations covered the following areas:
- identification of the hazard,
- control of casualties and
- command and control arrangements of the Emergency Services.
Purpose of Intervention
The purpose of the intervention was to:
- assess the adequacy of Urenco’s local and national arrangements for responding to an offsite transport emergency;
- assess the adequacy of Radsafe response arrangements;
- test ONR Transport’s emergency response arrangements (communications only);
- inform the ONR COP (Transport) risk based programme; and
- improve safety outcomes by assuring, and where necessary, improving levels of industry compliance with regulatory requirements and encouraging relevant good practice.
Interventions Carried Out by ONR
Due to only one member of ONR staff attending, only the response at the scene was assessed and consisted of:
- Observing the response at the scene;
- Attending the hot debrief.
Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate
Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made
The intervention was carried out by observation of activities at the scene of the incident. The following activities were assessed:
- Rescue and provision of emergency medical aid to any casualties,
- Control of fires and the other common consequences of transport accidents,
- Identification of the hazards of the material involved,
- Control of any radiation hazard and prevention of the spread of radioactive contamination,
- Recovery of the package, or packages, and transport vehicle,
- Decontamination of personnel,
- Decontamination and restoration of the thoroughfare and the delineation of the borders of other contaminated areas,
- Decontamination of other areas and restoration to a safe state.
ONR Transport rate emergency exercises in accordance with standard IIS rating guidelines for Transport Interventions.
No Findings were raised but various observations were made, mostly concerning the Emergency Services. These observations will be fed back to Urenco and followed up during subsequent interventions.
- Management of casualties, allowing casualties to return to the incident.
- Delay in provision of first aid to casualties due to reluctance by ambulance personnel to enter the cordoned off area and due to lack of information on the hazard present.
- Reluctance to transport contaminated persons in an ambulance until they had been decontaminated.
- Delay in timely identification of the hazard.
- Established the actual amount of material being carried.
- Minimum liaison with the Consignor
- Awareness of limitations of radiation monitoring equipment
- Emergency Services understanding the type and amount of class 7 material is being transported through its operational area
- NAIR invoked rather than Radsafe.
- ONR Transport team not able to fully test its initial response due to late notification.
- ‘Conflict in guidance information evidenced by ‘HazChem’ data sheets not aligned with Radsafe guidance.
Conclusion of Intervention
It is the opinion of ONR TIE , based on the evidence provided in observing Exercise Willow as described above, that Urenco’s emergency arrangements at Capenhurst are considered to be adequate for the purposes of compliance with the requirements of the Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment Regulations 2009.