Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Berkeley Nuclear Licensed Site Planned Inspections and Meetings

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

A system inspection of the safestore was undertaken to confirm the requirements of the safety case for the safestore were adequately incorporated into the arrangements for its periodic maintenance.  The information gained will be of value for planning the regulation of other Magnox nuclear licensed sites’ reactors going into their safestore configurations.

During the week I also looked into Berkeley’s progress with improving the demonstration of its nuclear baseline and progress with commissioning various projects on the site.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

Berkeley provided the safety case used to plan the maintenance work on the safestores.  The staff explained how this safety case had been incorporated into the 5-yearly maintenance programme.  I and a team of my colleagues inspected the reactor building and were shown from floor to floor the condition of the space between the biological shield and the weather proofing.  We were told how the licence conditions considered took into account the safety case and sampled documentation which demonstrated this.

During the visit I also:

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

The safestore safety system met the requirement of the safety case and was judged to be adequate.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

From the evidence we saw, Berkeley was managing the maintenance of the safestores adequately in line with the requirements of the safety case.  We saw very little evidence of weather damage within the safestore.  We were assured that appropriate maintenance was planned for the external surfaces and where leaks had occurred. The de-planting of the buildings before entry into safestore had made the maintenance entries for staff less hazardous.

Berkeley had improved the documentation that showed it had adequate resources to meet nuclear safety requirements.  There was still room for improvement but the overall demonstration was adequate and a significant improvement had been made since the June 2015 inspection.  This will help the site manage staff reductions while maintaining nuclear safety.

Preparations for the active commissioning of the equipment to remove the sections of control rods from the silo were going well.  We were shown how, if necessary, the sections could be returned to their storage locations in the silo.

Conclusion of Intervention

Berkeley demonstrated that they were maintaining the safestores adequately, in line with the requirement s of the safety case. Berkeley was controlling plans for staff reductions adequately.  Other work to reduce the hazards on the site is progressing well.