Office for Nuclear Regulation

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Devonshire Dock Complex - Planned Intervention

Executive summary

Purpose of intervention

This was a planned intervention at BAE Systems Marine Limited’s (BAESML’s) Devonshire Dock Complex (DDC) nuclear licensed site at Barrow, undertaken as part of the intervention strategy for the DDC site for 2015/16.

Interventions Carried Out by ONR

The BAESML Annual Review of Safety (ARoS) was held on 19 November 2015.  These reviews are one of the elements supporting continuous improvement at a nuclear licensed site.  The Superintending Nuclear inspector and the nominated site inspector (nuclear safety) represented ONR, whilst the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) was represented by an Inspector Reactor Build and a Principal Inspector Reactor Build.  The purpose of the ARoS includes reviewing safety since the last ARoS and looking forward to the plans to improve safety in the next year and in the longer term.  During the ARoS, DNSR focussed on reactor plant build whilst ONR focussed on site safety matters in line with the “letter of understanding” between DNSR and ONR.

In addition the nominated site inspector (nuclear safety) undertook planned information gathering.  This included:

In addition an ONR civil engineering specialist inspector and nominated site inspector gathered information relating to the Barrow Site Redevelopment Programme.

Explanation of Judgement if Safety System Not Judged to be Adequate

Not applicable.

Key Findings, Inspector's Opinions and Reasons for Judgements Made

In terms of the ARoS process, ONR considers this to have been effective.  The process was facilitated by provision of an Information Pack prior to the review meeting, which allowed the meeting itself to focus more strategically on the forward look.  To further improve the ARoS process for next year, ONR suggested the following main items for consideration:  provision of separate input of the BAESML internal regulator to the Information Pack and to the review meeting; additional use of safety performance indicator data in the Information Pack; and, adoption of a “4 box model” approach for the Information Pack and for the review meeting presentations.  These “boxes” being:  highlights in the last year; opportunities for improvement in the last year; the status of safety improvements that were planned in the last year; and, safety improvements planned for the next year.

In terms of ARoS outcomes, ONR concluded that declining safety performance had been arrested, but that significant work remains to secure continuous improvement.  ONR highlighted several areas for BAESML to address to secure continuous improvement.  These included:  aspects of safety culture; implementing an Integrated Management System that gives due account to nuclear safety;  delivering the Licence Condition Compliance Improvement programme to cover all the Licence Conditions/Authorisation Conditions;  continuing the work to improve the BAESML internal regulator;  and, completing the modern standards safety case programme and developing and implementing an integrated programme of Periodic Review of Safety findings.

In relation to the other activities undertaken in this intervention, no key findings arose.

Conclusion of Intervention

From the evidence gathered during this intervention, no matters have been identified that are likely to have a significant impact on nuclear safety on the site at this time.  Therefore, no further regulatory action arising from this visit is considered necessary.